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PART I
A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF ‘‘THE MYTH
OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE’’
Derrin Culp
[Editor’s note: The Nonproliferation Review presents here a debate in three parts, featuring a critique by
Derrin Culp of Ward Wilson’s 2008 award-winning article ‘‘The Myth of Nuclear Deterrence,’’ a response
from Wilson, and a finally a closing counter from Culp. We invite readers to join the debate via letters to
the editor (sschwartz@miis.edu).]
Several years ago, Ward Wilson presented in this journal a wide-ranging challenge to what every
generation of national security scholars and practitioners since the end of World War II has been
taught about nuclear weapons. He asserted that nuclear deterrence amounts to far less than its
proponents have claimed and provocatively suggested that nuclear deterrence is a myth. Relying upon
both empirical and theoretical objections to nuclear deterrence, he concluded that its failures were
clear-cut and indisputable, whereas its successes were speculative. Yet in spite of a flourishing trade in
scholarly articles, think tank reports, blog posts, and opinion pieces concerning nuclear deterrence,
nobody*including nuclear weapons scholars*has ventured more than a limited critique of Wilson’s
essay. There are, however, serious shortcomings in Wilson’s arguments*deficiencies that make his
essay an unpersuasive brief against nuclear deterrence. Wilson’s thesis could be correct. His arguments,
however, are unlikely to persuade any skeptical members of Congress, upon whom future progress in
arms control depends, to reconsider the value they attach to nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence.
KEYWORDS: Nuclear deterrence; nuclear weapons; United States; Soviet Union; Israel;
United Kingdom
It has been more than three years since the Nonproliferation Review published Ward
Wilson’s award-winning essay, ‘‘The Myth of Nuclear Deterrence,’’ in which he argued
that nuclear deterrence is an unsound basis for a national security strategy.1 Wilson
made three key claims: first, nuclear deterrence rests upon a fatally flawed fundamental
premise; second, deterrent threats are inherently not credible and lead antagonists and
enemies to behave in ways that are inimical to the goals of deterrence; and third,
nuclear deterrence has an unalloyed record of failure.
Numerous articles, blog posts, and opinion pieces advocating the abolition of nuclear
weapons have cited Wilson’s essay to support claims that absent proof that nuclear
deterrence ‘‘works,’’ the global community must banish nuclear weapons forever.2 Key
arguments from his essay also inform a substantial policy piece, ‘‘Delegitimizing Nuclear
Weapons: Examining the Validity of Nuclear Deterrence,’’ which Wilson coauthored for the
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) for the Swiss Federal Department of
Foreign Affairs.3 Some have claimed that Wilson ‘‘is increasingly the source of fundamental
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challenges to the nuclear status quo,’’ and that he ‘‘is well on his way to deconstructing the
most fundamental beliefs about nuclear weapons.’’4 Given Wilson’s comprehensive challenge
to deterrence orthodoxy, critiques of the essay have been surprisingly few and far between.5
This article asserts, however, that there are significant deficiencies in Wilson’s
arguments for all three of his fundamental claims about nuclear deterrence. As long as
members of the nuclear zero movement intend to rely upon this essay as an intellectual
resource, they should be aware of these weaknesses.
Problem One: Deterrence Rests upon a Shaky Theoretical Foundation
Nuclear deterrence theory, according to Wilson, is based on the misguided belief that
threats to retaliate by destroying cities and killing their inhabitants will induce sufficient
fear and restraint among potential adversaries that they will not attack. ‘‘At the heart of
the theory,’’ Wilson writes, ‘‘is faith that the prospect of city destruction creates decisive
leverage. No exchange is likely between adversaries with nuclear weapons . . . because
a fight in which numerous cities are destroyed is unacceptable. In a conflict between a
state with nuclear weapons and a state without nuclear weapons, even if only a few
weapons are used against cities . . . the state without would immediately surrender.’’6
Wilson would have us believe that there has been widespread misconception
among students of military history that destroying an enemy’s cities is sufficient to elicit
surrender in virtually all circumstances. He also conflates enemy decisions to surrender
and enemy decisions not to attack (the latter being the objective of deterrent threats).
As in the immediately preceding quotation, Wilson moves back and forth between the
concepts of surrender and forbearance as if they were interchangeable; to Wilson, two
different beliefs*that actual city destruction almost always brings about surrender, and
that threats of retaliatory city destruction will almost always lead enemies to choose not
to attack*are virtually indistinguishable.
Wilson invokes nuclear scholars from Bernard Brodie to Thomas Schelling to
establish that ‘‘destroying cities . . . is central to nuclear war,’’ and that ‘‘city attacks [are]
squarely at the heart of nuclear deterrence.’’7 He then asserts that this emphasis on city
destruction results from the belief that political leaders care deeply about those they
govern, or at least identify strongly with them. ‘‘We assume,’’ he writes, ‘‘that threats
with nuclear weapons work because we assume that threats to harm civilians matter.
We assume, in other words, that leaders are influenced in decisions about war and
surrender by the deaths of noncombatants.’’8
What he means is that when nuclear powers communicate deterrent threats that hold
opponents’ cities at risk, it is not because enemy leaders are reluctant to see their economy,
infrastructure, government buildings, cultural heritage, or environment destroyed. Instead,
nuclear powers target cities because they assume that enemy leaders are*like them*
sentimental. They are influenced by the deaths of co-nationals or members of the same clan
or ‘‘tribe’’; the deaths of people with whom the leaders identify and value as ‘‘their own’’ or
similar to them; or the deaths of people on whom the leaders look paternally. Having




























or their children, enemy leaders would certainly surrender rather than suffer further losses.
And, if they would be inclined to capitulate following an actual city attack, they will forbear
from attacking in the first place if faced with a deterrent threat targeting their cities.
The first half of Wilson’s paper is an effort to prove that these are bad assump-
tions and that because nuclear deterrence relies upon them, it must be faulty as well.
‘‘The evidence,’’ he writes, ‘‘supports the notion that there is a very high tolerance for
civilian suffering in war,’’ and as a result, ‘‘city attacks do not coerce.’’9 He seems to think
that if he definitively disproves the idea that city destruction leads to surrender, he will*
through some obscure logic*persuade his audience to believe that nuclear deterrence
actually is built upon that very notion. He offers examples across a millennium of city
destruction that did not lead to surrender*Hamburg, Coventry, the Japan fire bombings,
Samarkand, Bokhara, Magdeburg, Atlanta, and Richmond. With each example comes
the implied rebuke: ‘‘See, believers in nuclear deterrence, wrong yet again!’’
In many of Wilson’s examples, though, it is no great revelation that the destruc-
tion of a particular city was not militarily decisive. It is almost as if his initial premise had
been that nuclear deterrence rests upon the belief that most apples are blue, and he
then had proceeded to reveal the fragility of nuclear deterrence theory by carefully
demonstrating that most apples are red.
What makes his claim initially seem reasonable is its appeal to the sensibilities of
twenty-first-century Americans*the idea that when political leaders decide how to react
to nuclear deterrent threats, the potential toll in human life (in particular, the lives of
co-nationals) is the paramount consideration. This is what permits readers to nod in
agreement and*at least momentarily*buy into Wilson’s position that nuclear deterrence
theorists actually believe in the power of city destruction to bring conflicts to a screech-
ing halt. To someone who never had considered the issue, it would be completely
understandable if nuclear deterrence theorists and nuclear war strategists had assumed
that city destruction could (or even must) have a significant impact on military conflicts.
Even if erroneous, it would ring true.
It would, however, be totally unexpected if nuclear deterrence theorists had
thrown their entire professional and disciplinary training out the window and ignored
the historical and political context of the Thirty Years War or Genghis Khan’s Khwarazm
campaign (two of Wilson’s primary examples). Abundant information about both con-
flicts was available during the Cold War; it is not the product of very recent research and
scholarship.
Although there was a Khwarazmian Empire, there was no Khwarazmian nation or
tribe.10 The Turkish Khwarazm shahs imposed their territorial control little more than a
decade before the Mongol invasion began in 1219. The rulers and administrative class
were indifferent to the indigenous Persian population, economically exploited it, and
antagonized local Islamic religious leaders. The largely mercenary Khwarazmian army
was renowned for its brutality, and the shah’s subjects periodically reciprocated by mas-
sacring bureaucrats and soldiers. ‘‘In none of the provinces they conquered did the
Khwarazm Shahs ever succeed in creating a bond of interest between themselves and
their subjects,’’ according to historians Ali Sevim and Clifford Bosworth.11 In fact, when
Genghis Khan appeared in the east, the reigning shah immediately fled west. He did not



























identify with the inhabitants of the cities that Genghis Khan attacked, mourn the civilian
deaths, or stick around long enough even to consider surrendering.
As to the destruction of the Saxon city of Magdeburg in 1631, Wilson doesn’t
indicate why any of the Holy Roman Empire’s thousand separate and semiautonomous
political units might have been motivated to consider surrender because the deaths at
Magdeburg mattered to them. Certainly the Catholic Habsburg emperor, whose own
troops besieged Magdeburg, would not have considered surrender on account of civilian
lives. Nor would have the other North German Protestant princes. In order to preserve
or restore their traditional political, economic, and religious privileges, these princes
subjected their population and territories to violence for decades, reacting to the ebb and
flow of their military successes and failures and those of the foreign kings who inter-
vened in pursuit of their own agendas. One can scarcely imagine that the monarchs of
Denmark, Sweden, France, and Spain*all major parties to the conflict by 1631*cared
at all about the deaths in Magdeburg.
It is unlikely that anyone who had read even a little bit of this history would have
come away with the conclusion that city destruction usually brings about surrender or
been surprised that it did not in these instances. One is left to wonder if Wilson believes
that the ‘‘wise men and women’’*American and Soviet*who developed deterrence
theory were merely unaware of the historical record he cites or if instead they ignored or
grossly misinterpreted it.
As for the city bombing campaigns of World War II, the examples of which Wilson
also relies on, he simply states that ‘‘World War II bombing, despite the predictions, gives
little support to the claim that bombing civilians is decisive.’’12 Whose predictions?
Wilson’s authorities are the Italian general Giulio Douhet, author of The Command of
the Air (1921) and Billy Mitchell, a US Army general who was court-martialed for insub-
ordination and stripped of his rank in 1926.13 Although Douhet and Mitchell died in 1930
and 1936, respectively, Wilson gives the impression that during World War II they were
at the table as leading advocates of city bombing. He does not offer any evidence that
the military and political leaders who planned and authorized the bombing campaigns
expected them to lead to prompt surrender.
A review of an admittedly small and arbitrary selection of analyses from the vast
literature on strategic bombing in World War II strongly suggests that few of its pro-
ponents predicted that it would lead to surrender in either theater.14 Neither British nor
US political and military leaders had a unified or internally consistent viewpoint on what
strategic bombing could achieve, and both nations continuously reassessed their
approach. Competing doctrinal schools emphasized targeting of cities and civilians (to
break national morale), aircraft factories, heavy industry, small home and neighborhood-
based suppliers, transportation infrastructure and logistical bottlenecks, and oil produc-
tion and electrical transmission. British bombing doctrine emphasized destroying the
Germans’ will to fight, while US city bombing*in both Europe and Japan*consistently
emphasized disrupting production that supported the enemy war effort. Yet this
emphasis was neither absolute nor doctrinaire. Allied leaders generally felt it was better
to bomb whatever they could*regardless of its genuine impact on the enemy*as long




























Tami Davis Biddle wrote in 2002, ‘‘By the winter of 194445 [the Americans] targeted
just about everything they could think of, hoping to hit upon some means of affecting
enemy behavior, directly or indirectly.’’15
During World War II, Sir Arthur Harris of the Royal Air Force’s Bomber Command
may have been the only true believer in the war-ending power of city bombing.
He ardently believed that air power could deliver a lethal blow if properly resourced and
freed from diversions such as antisubmarine warfare and providing cover for ground
operations. His boss Winston Churchill, on the other hand, profoundly and unabashedly
questioned the efficacy of strategic bombing to the bitter end. Even in June 1945, US
military planners viewed strategic bombing not as a means to precipitate surrender, but
as a way to weaken Japanese defenses and make the impending invasion less deadly to
Americans.
Wilson’s arguments hinge not only on the implausible premise that proponents of
nuclear deterrence have totally misread the history of city attacks, but on the equally
implausible notion that they have embraced a simplistic theory of how wars end:
if an enemy’s cities are destroyed, it will surrender.
Over the last two decades, scholars of what political scientists call ‘‘war termination’’
have tended to agree with political scientist Dan Reiter’s assessment that ‘‘we know
relatively little about how wars end, in contrast to the mountain ranges of ideas and
scholarship we have about how wars start.’’16 Security studies scholar Elizabeth Stanley
wrote in 2009 that ‘‘at a theoretical level, the question of war termination remains largely
unanswered.’’17 Gideon Rose, now the editor of Foreign Affairs, asserted in his doctoral
dissertation that ‘‘the facts on the final phases of most conflicts remain undigested.’’18
In his view, ‘‘the one insight common to the best work in the area is that ending a war is
usually a torturous process.’’19 Much of the work on which this scholarship is based was
available during the Cold War; it is hard to imagine that nuclear deterrence theorists were
unaware of or dismissed it in favor of a mechanistic, binary theory of surrender.
Having posited that nuclear deterrence is grounded in faith that city destruction
almost always elicits surrender, Wilson thereafter proceeds as if it is understood that
deterrence theory assumes that threats to destroy cities in retaliation almost always elicit
forbearance. He doesn’t explain how he made this leap, or even acknowledge that he
has made it, but the argument has prima facie validity anyway. An enemy that would
surrender upon the actual destruction of its cities could reasonably be expected to refrain
from attacking, if faced with retaliation that would destroy its cities.
As University of Leeds international studies professor Christoph Bluth has pointed
out, forbearance and surrender involve two very different kinds of decisions, one made
while deterrence still has a chance to succeed and the other after deterrence already
has failed.20 Scholars of war termination observe that both the decision-making process
and the cost-benefit calculations when a state is approaching the end of a military conflict
are likely to be very different from those that precede the start of a war. The most basic
distinction is that decisions to attack or forbear are based upon much less information
about antagonists’ intentions, motivations, and capabilities than decisions to surrender or
continue fighting; the latter come after additional months or years of diplomacy, battles,
and changing domestic and international politics.21



























Rose noted that ‘‘the politico-military decisions which national leaders make at
the end of a war are similar theoretically to those made at the beginning, but the former
occur against the backdrop of the fighting itself*the triumphs and defeats experienced,
the costs incurred and the hopes and passions raised.’’22 Stanley wrote that ‘‘belligerents
continuously update their expectations [of victory or defeat, gains and costs] throughout
[a] war, based on observed battle outcomes, rejected diplomatic offers and unreasonable
demands from the other side.’’23 Rose cited theorist Carl von Clausewitz’s observation that
‘‘the original political objects [of a war] can greatly alter during the course of the war
and may finally change entirely since they are influenced by events and their probable
consequences.’’24 Wilson’s unacknowledged pivot from ‘‘deterrence theory assumes that
city destruction causes surrender’’ to ‘‘deterrence theory assumes that threats of city
destruction cause forbearance’’ is therefore dubious.
If in fact nuclear deterrence does rely fundamentally upon the threat of city
destruction, such faith probably didn’t result from nuclear strategists grossly misreading
the record of city destruction, ignoring the scholarship on war termination, treating for-
bearance and surrender as the same thing, or harboring romantic and historically
unsupported notions of how Harry Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Joseph Stalin, or
Nikita Khrushchev would have reacted to destruction of a major city.
So how else might nuclear deterrence theory have acquired such reliance? Perhaps,
after all, national leaders actually are averse to losing their infrastructure, natural
environment, palaces, and cultural patrimony*even if indifferent to the survival of their
countrymen. The most likely factor, however, is the most obvious one: a sober comparison
of the magnitude of destruction nuclear weapons could inflict versus anything mankind
previously had known.
Wilson would discount such comparisons, based largely upon Japanese leaders’
willingness to subject civilians to ghastly and unprecedented punishment in the Allied
fire bombings during the spring of 1945 and their delayed surrender after Hiroshima.
Those episodes demonstrate to his satisfaction that not even Hiroshima-level nuclear
attacks can guarantee that an enemy will surrender.25 But how could Cold War nuclear
policy makers not have considered the possibility, or even the likelihood, that nu-
clear weapons had abruptly rendered all of the historical examples cited by Wilson*
including those of 1945*totally irrelevant?
How could they not have wondered if a US nuclear attack on Tokyo immediately
after Pearl Harbor might have had a dramatically different impact than the fire bombings
that began more than three years into Japan’s war with the United States, after Japan
already had sustained more than a million military deaths?26 Or if a single nuclear attack
that immediately killed 10 percent of metropolitan Tokyo’s population (approximately
700,000 deaths) might have evoked a far different reaction from Japan’s leaders than the
fire bombings, which occurred over five months and killed 150,000250,000 people
nationwide?27 What if, in 1945, the United States had possessed thermonuclear weapons
and attacked Japan with a single bomb that obliterated Tokyo?28 Is it not ludicrous to
deny the significance of the quantum increase in lethality with nuclear weapons and





























Of course, counterfactuals cannot disprove Wilson’s claim, and if he were to
insist that there is no level of prospective civilian deaths or physical destruction that
dependably can deter national leaders, he would not be alone. Some military and political
officials in the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush administrations believed that certain
leaders can be deterred only by threats to their own life. Under both presidents the
Department of Defense and the Department of Energy engaged in research on ‘‘bunker-
buster’’ nuclear weapons intended to hold at risk deeply buried fortresses where such an
enemy might otherwise hide and survive, even as the United States delivered retaliatory
nuclear strikes that utterly destroyed his country.29
But is Wilson’s fundamental premise about nuclear deterrence*at least the US
practice of deterrence*correct? Did American leaders generally believe that threaten-
ing to destroy Soviet cities was the best way to create Soviet fear of unacceptable
losses? Were declaratory US nuclear policies and nuclear war plans consistent with that
belief? It is beyond the scope of this critique either to answer these important questions
or to evaluate the specific authorities upon whom Wilson relies. However, evidence that
US nuclear weapons targeting practices during the first three decades of the nuclear era
were quite loosely informed by deterrence theory and did not focus on destroying Soviet
cities seems to challenge Wilson’s premise.30
Historian David Alan Rosenberg wrote in 1983 that while the conceptual work
‘‘of strategic theorists . . . occasionally influenced the thinking of high policymakers or
strategic planners, it generally had little relevance in the 19451960 period to the prag-
matic concerns of operational planners.’’31 That conclusion reverberated in the remi-
niscences of senior defense and nuclear weapons laboratory officials in a 2005 Sandia
National Laboratories oral history of US strategic nuclear policy. According to the
officials, throughout the 1940s and 1950s the executive branch, Congress, and the labs
all ‘‘made it up as we went along.’’ The growth and composition of the nuclear arsenal
in the 1950s and 1960s was driven by the capabilities of the nuclear weapons complex
without a clear understanding of national policies, objectives, or military requirements
for nuclear weapons, the officials said.32 Stanford University scholar Lynn Eden agreed,
characterizing SIOP-62 (the US Single Integrated Operational Plan, the military’s actual
plan for fighting a nuclear war in the early 1960s) as a ‘‘capabilities plan’’ in which
targeting derived from the availability of weapons and delivery vehicles rather than a
determination of military need.33 William Kaufman, a key Department of Defense con-
sultant in the 1960s and 1970s, recalled the emergence of counterforce in the 1960s,
saying that ‘‘nobody could guarantee that if you did counterforce and not counter-city,
it would work out. But it was worth a chance.’’34
The nuclear establishment’s willingness through the 1960s to explore numerous
approaches to targeting*command and control, military assets, civilian populations,
‘‘no cities,’’ industrial capacity, and economic recovery*recapitulated the experimental
and theoretically malleable US approach to WWII strategic bombing. During that period,
developing a consensus on the nature of deterrence apparently was a low priority.
According to Rosenberg, the National Security Council’s 1960 ‘‘Hickey Committee’’ report
to President Eisenhower essentially ignored the president’s charge to advise him on
whether deterrence would be better served by targeting military or urban industrial



























targets.35 SIOPs were viewed not as instruments of deterrence, but as plans of retaliation
should deterrence fail, according to Eden.36 In the early 1970s, nuclear war planners
explicitly considered whether deterrence should be a stated mission of the SIOP, and
decided no.37 SIOP-62, the product of fifteen years of nuclear age strategizing, included
nearly 3,300 weapons, 7,800 megatons, and approximately 3,700 targets in all categories.38
A contemporary estimate placed its destruction at 54 percent of the Soviet population,
71 percent of the urban population, and 82 percent of buildings.39 None of this is con-
sistent with an argument that US nuclear policy makers or war planners had a clear
conception of deterrence based upon the belief that threats to destroy a handful of cities
would deter Soviet aggression.
Problem Two: Deterrent Threats Are Inherently Not Credible and Provoke
Attack and Resistance Rather than Forbearance
Wilson claims that most people associate nuclear weapons with extermination attacks:
‘‘One of the salient weaknesses of nuclear deterrence has always been its implicit reliance
on threats of extermination attacks.’’40 This association, in Wilson’s view, undermines the
credibility of nuclear deterrent threats. Political leaders just don’t believe that their
adversaries would actually follow through on a threat to exterminate them. Why? Not
because of morality or because exterminating others is inconsistent with human nature,
but because of statistics.
Threats Not Credible
Wilson’s views on this point arise from his own ‘‘moderately thorough review of the
history of warfare across some 3,000 years.’’41 He concludes that the Third Punic War
was the only war of extermination during those millennia and that wars of extermination
are by their nature extremely rare. ‘‘It is difficult to argue that a human action that has
only occurred once in 3,000 years is likely to recur.’’42
In other words, the historical absence of wars of extermination is not simply a lucky
roll of the dice, based upon unique historical circumstances that won’t necessarily prevail
forever. Unlike in the investment world, here past performance actually is a guarantee of
future results, and one should expect that in the future, wars of extermination will occur
rarely, if ever. If threats of extermination attack are not credible because leaders believe
such attacks almost never occur, and if the threat to use nuclear weapons is synonymous
with the threat to exterminate, then nuclear threats cannot be credible either.
There are some problems with this line of reasoning. For one, Wilson does not
support his claim that nuclear deterrent threats are inextricably linked to extermination
in the minds of political and military leaders (or in the popular imagination). No doubt
images and descriptions of doomsday and Armageddon figure prominently in movies,
television, and other popular culture representations of nuclear war, but what is the basis





























The main difficulty, though, is that the count of wars of extermination is Wilson’s
and his alone. It is based upon his definition*a war that ‘‘must aim at the total
destruction and slaughter of the adversary’’*as well as his assessment of the facts and his
judgment of intent.43 History’s great genocides are excluded. A war that actually wiped
out 50 percent of a population would not qualify, nor would a war that aimed merely
to displace an entire nation and turn its people into refugees, or a war that destroyed
the most potent symbols of a nation’s collective identity. Imagine a war that left many
Americans alive, yet destroyed the original Declaration of Independence, the Grand
Canyon, the Statue of Liberty, the Capitol, the Supreme Court, and the Gettysburg
battlefield. The issue of intent is particularly vexing, given that elsewhere, Wilson cautions
that discerning leaders’ intent is daunting.44 Wilson is entitled to opine on a vast swath
of global military history, but one can imagine that if he were to provide the scorecard
with his war-by-war assessment of just how close each conflict came to a ‘‘war of
extermination,’’ there would be countless second opinions.
His definition of wars of extermination also is curiously inconsistent with his
assertions elsewhere in the essay that attacks on civilians are invariably perceived as
attempts to exterminate the targeted population.45 Given the litany of attacks on cities
that Wilson reports, one might have expected him to infer that extermination attacks had
been abundant. His conclusions that extermination attacks are innately rare and that
threats to exterminate are innately not credible are at odds with his statement that neither
human nature nor norms of morality inevitably preclude such attacks.46 And in the real
world, they also are beside the point. What truly lacks credibility is the idea that national
leaders, in making existential decisions about how to interpret and respond to possible
nuclear threats, would give anywhere near as much weight to any idiosyncratic reckoning
of the historical frequency of extermination attacks as to the warheads that they know
are pointed at them.
Nuclear Deterrent Threats Cause Resistance, Not Forbearance
Wilson also argues that threats of nuclear retaliation elicit unlimited resistance rather than
restraint and are counterproductive to the goal of deterrence. In his view, communicating
nuclear threats is politically equivalent to engaging in terrorism, and societies perceive
terrorist violence against civilians as threats of extermination. ‘‘Terrorism,’’ he writes,
‘‘is supposed to work by killing civilians in order to shock and horrify governments into
complying with a terrorist’s demands. Nuclear attack also threatens civilians . . . even
nuclear attacks aimed at military targets.’’47
He also recounts a key finding from Max Abrahms’s 2006 article ‘‘Why Terrorism
Does Not Work’’: terrorist violence against civilians rarely achieves the terrorists’ political
objectives because it is viewed as an attempt to destroy the victims’ ‘‘values, society
or both.’’48 This leads Wilson to the question, ‘‘if terrorist attacks are the closest and best
analogy to nuclear attacks against cities, and if terrorist attacks rarely succeed, what basis
is there for confidence that nuclear deterrence will succeed?’’49 Put slightly differently, if
actual terrorist violence against citizens doesn’t induce governments to meet terrorist



























demands, why would a mere threat of violence against citizens through nuclear retaliation
induce governments to accede to demands not to attack?
Wilson acknowledges*but quickly moves on from*one problem with trying to
evaluate nuclear deterrence using this tortured analogy to terrorism: ‘‘Nuclear attacks
would kill innocents on a scale so vast that it seems difficult to count ordinary terrorism as
the same phenomenon.’’50 That is a huge problem, but hardly the only one. Not only
does he draw a hefty conclusion*that attacks against civilians are invariably interpreted
as threats of extermination*from a single source, he unjustifiably enlarges Abrahms’s
findings to get there.
Abrahms identifies the things that victims of terrorism fear may be taken away from
them; in twenty cases, he says it is some combination of values, society, nation, or state.
An aggressive interpretation of this formulation could mean that victims of terrorist
violence fear subjugation or even enslavement*both outcomes that well might lead a
society to resist to the death. But the loss of values, society, nation, or state does not
necessarily imply extermination*a term that Abrahms’s article never uses.51 Abrahms
does not conclude, as Wilson does, that ‘‘if you attack civilians . . . no matter what sort of
message you intend to communicate, you are likely to simply convince your opponent
that you intend to exterminate him.’’52 In three instances, Abrahms’s wording can be
interpreted to mean that societies perceive terrorism against civilians as attempts to
wipe out an entire people, but Wilson has selected the most extreme and least defen-
sible interpretation of Abrahms’ findings.53 Yet the biggest problem with this argument
is that it never actually associates nuclear deterrence with the logic of terrorism. All of
Wilson’s important points link nuclear attack*not deterrent threats*to terrorist violence.
None of these, obviously, can be evaluated empirically:
. ‘‘Nuclear attack also threatens civilians.’’54
. ‘‘A nuclear attack against a city*even if it were only a single weapon used
against a single city, and even if it were accompanied by a strongly worded
diplomatic message*seems likely to be read as a sign that the enemy intends to
attempt to destroy your country completely.’’55
. ‘‘It seems likely that most leaders would interpret nuclear attacks against cities
not as sophisticated signaling or as demonstrations of resolve, but as the first in a
series of attacks intended to annihilate the entire country.’’56
. It may well be that*far from motivating nations to concede*nuclear attacks
drive nations to fight to the death.’’57
This approach blurs the distinction between deterring and attacking. Reprising the earlier
error of conflating forbearance and surrender, Wilson here conflates threatening to harm
civilians and actually doing it. As laid out by Wilson, State A attempts to dissuade State B
from attacking State A or its allies by threatening to retaliate against State B with nuclear
weapons. State A is threatening to harm civilians in State B, in order to ‘‘shock and horrify’’
State B’s government enough so that it will not attack. Therefore, according to Wilson,
State A (the one trying to foreclose the possibility of attack on itself) is acting like a




























In contrast, Wilson’s statement that ‘‘terrorism is supposed to work by killing civilians
in order to shock and horrify governments into complying with a terrorist’s demands’’
has it exactly right. It is the actual killing of civilians rather than the threat to kill civilians
that might induce a government to meet terrorists’ demands. Wilson also mentions that in
World War II, the Allied governments unapologetically called the city bombing campaigns
against Japan and Germany ‘‘terror bombing,’’ reinforcing the idea that the act of killing
civilians, rather than threatening to kill civilians, is at the heart of terrorism. Ethicists can
differ in their conclusions, but there has to be a distinction between threatening to inflict
harm and actually doing it.
In the case where State B attacks State A, in spite of State A’s threat to retaliate with
nuclear weapons, nuclear deterrence has failed, but not because State B misread State A’s
threat as the threat of extermination. A’s threat itself did not push B over the edge and
cause the initial attack. The threat to retaliate may not have been persuasive, but it was
not, by its nature, counterproductive, as Wilson alleges.
Problem Three: Nuclear Deterrence Has a Dismal Track Record
In the final sections of his paper, Wilson pulls together various strands of evidence
concerning the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence. Taking up the argument that nuclear
deterrence cannot necessarily claim credit for the absence of nuclear attacks or great
power conflict since 1945, he enunciates a tough standard in order to claim that prize:
‘‘In order to answer the question ‘did deterrence work?’ you must first be able to
know whether your opponent had a fully formed intention to attack and then refrained
from doing so because of your threat.’’58 This standard seems excessive for several
reasons, not the least of which is that ‘‘fully formed’’ is very much in the eye of the
beholder.
As in Wilson’s reckoning of historical wars of extermination, intent here is key.
He emphasizes the difficulty of discerning statesmen’s intentions, but seems of two minds
about the implication of this caveat. His quotation from behavioral scientist Alexander L.
George and political scientist Richard Smoke urges skepticism concerning evidence that
leaders were deterred.59 On the other hand, he says that because statesmen are reluctant
to admit they’ve been thwarted, one should be cautious in accepting their statements
that they were not; leaders may have been deterred more than they let on.60
Furthermore, Wilson’s threshold reflects the perspective that a firm decision to
attack must precede consideration of retaliatory threats; the processes of deciding to
attack, evaluating threats of retaliation, and deciding not to attack are sequential and
independent. However, these processes occur simultaneously and influence each other.
It would seem reasonable to conclude that nuclear deterrence had succeeded if an
enemy’s knowledge and perception of the deterrent threat had removed attack from
his menu of viable options, or substantially raised his threshold for considering attack.
Compared to Wilson’s standard for deterrence success, this alternative is very modest.
One can at least imagine the possibility of demonstrating that a deterrent threat changed
an enemy’s assessment or ranking of its options in this way.



























Bluth recently attempted to do precisely that, arguing that the threat of Western
retaliation with nuclear weapons (coupled with the death of Stalin) had several profound
effects on Soviet national policy and military doctrine.61 According to Bluth, nuclear
deterrent threats convinced Soviet leaders that attacking the West was tantamount to
national suicide and initiating the end of civilization on earth. It led them to repudiate
the Leninist doctrine of the ‘‘inevitably of war,’’ reject war with imperialist states as a tool
to advance world revolution, reconsider the strategic merits and potential of surprise
attack, contain conflicts at a local or sub-regional level, and make avoidance of global
or total war their ultimate objective.
Wilson repeats his ‘‘chicken and egg’’ conundrum when he notes that ‘‘there is little
evidence that either the United States or the Soviet Union was ever on the brink of
launching an aggressive war against the other’’ and asks, ‘‘How is it possible to assert
that deterrence prevented war without clear evidence that war was ever imminent?’’62
If there was not a potential great power military confrontation to be deterred, he wonders,
how can one credit deterrence with anything?
Here again, Wilson has specified a threshold for crediting nuclear deterrence*war
between America and the Soviet Union was imminent*that would be almost impossible
to document. However, the term ‘‘nuclear crisis’’ did not permanently enter America’s
national security lexicon by accident; in a handful of incidents*Suez in 1956, Berlin in
1959, Cuba in 1962, the Middle East in 1973*US leaders acutely perceived a significantly
heightened risk of nuclear conflict with another nuclear state.
Many would agree, though, that the Cold War antagonists were not perpetually on
the brink of war. Even so, unlike Ohio State University’s John Mueller, in his classic
International Security article ‘‘The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the
Postwar World,’’ Wilson doesn’t advance any explanation as to why not, if not nuclear
deterrence.63 In fact, he questions why we even need such an explanation. ‘‘Most major
wars,’’ he writes, ‘‘are followed by periods, sometimes quite long periods, of relative
peace.’’ He asks why explanations offered for periods of peace after earlier wars aren’t
considered sufficient for the nuclear era.64 It would be easy to turn these questions on
their head. Why should analysts fall back on facile explanations for peace such as ‘‘war
weariness,’’ ‘‘economic exhaustion,’’ and ‘‘domestic political distraction’’ that are largely
disconnected from international relations theory?
At least through the 1970s, the United States and Soviet Union were ideologically
hostile, mutually suspicious, and fearful of each other. In the early Cold War period, US
public political discourse often addressed American desires to ‘‘roll back’’ the Soviet
domination of Eastern Europe, and the national security establishment contemplated
preventive wars against the Soviet Union and China.65 For much of the Cold War, the
Soviet Union was not a ‘‘status quo state.’’ So if not fear of nuclear war, what was it that
kept such virulently adversarial foes at arm’s length? Answering this question was beyond
the scope of Wilson’s essay, but acknowledging it should not have been.
Wilson challenges the validity of nuclear deterrence theory by reciting a litany of
instances when possession of nuclear weapons purportedly failed to confer the expected
advantage. This list is a mixture of diplomatic and military disappointments, including




























the brief US nuclear monopoly and then military difficulties in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq,
and Afghanistan. It also includes the Soviet Union’s defeat in Afghanistan, the United
Kingdom’s three-month Falkland Islands war with Argentina, and the Yom Kippur War.
The list rests upon a conception of nuclear deterrence as a strategy that should
prevent not merely attack on a state’s or its allies’ home soil, but also civil wars, diplo-
matic challenges, and attacks on non-allies or remote imperial outposts. Any debit in a
nuclear weapon state’s foreign relations ledger constitutes a failure of nuclear deterrence
and proves the worthlessness of nuclear weapons. For Wilson, this list is a potent
indictment of nuclear deterrence, but it is more like a caricature. Nuclear deterrence is
only expected to work if the dissuader’s threats of nuclear retaliation appear credible to
the potential attacker. Did deterrence really fail Britain in the spring of 1982? Did anyone
truly believe there was an understood, implied British threat to retaliate with nuclear
weapons should some country invade the Falklands? Is it understood today that the
United States would retaliate with nuclear weapons if Germany used military force to
pursue an irredentist claim to American Samoa?
To impugn the deterrent value of nuclear weapons because they cannot do
everything nuclear states would desire is akin to questioning that aspirin relieves head-
aches and prevents death from certain heart attacks because it does not also prevent
baldness. This particular recurring indictment of nuclear deterrence should be allowed a
dignified retirement.
We cannot prove that since 1945, nuclear deterrence has prevented nuclear and
conventional attacks on the homeland of nuclear states and their allies. But none of
Wilson’s examples of nuclear states’ military or diplomatic setbacks in any way weakens
the argument that nuclear deterrence has been an incredibly important factor. Even
Wilson grudgingly agrees, at least halfway: ‘‘Although the practical record does not
indict this form of deterrence, the general theoretical objections to it still apply.’’66
It is bothersome that Wilson makes sweeping statements about the ineffectiveness of
deterrence without appraising the scholarship on the two cases he considers the strong-
est examples of failed deterrence*the Yom Kippur War and the Falkland Islands War.67
Likewise, he offers no evidentiary support for his overall judgment that ‘‘although the
successes of nuclear deterrence over the thirty years from 1950 to 1980 are speculative,
its failures are not.’’68
Wilson is correct that by 1973, both Egypt and Syria knew that Israel had a nuclear
weapons program, and there are hints that Egypt may have believed that Israel already
possessed deliverable weapons.69 The evidence consists of Egyptian president Gamal
Abdel Nasser’s earlier public statements and private assertions to US officials that he
would launch a preventive attack on Dimona if he believed Israel was near a nuclear
breakout; a US diplomatic estimate that Nasser actually would follow through on this
threat; Seymour Hersh’s reportage that the Soviets informed Egypt that Israel had three
operational warheads; and private correspondence with former Egyptian generals and the
editor of a prominent Arabic newspaper. Analysts also infer that Egypt may have pegged
the Israel nuclear threat as serious based upon limited evidence that the Egyptian military
was developing Dimona options and upon Anwar Sadat’s conversations with Henry



























Kissinger, possibly intended to alert Israel that Egyptian military actions would not
threaten Israel’s core interests.
But these hints are hardly dispositive. Israeli nuclear expert Avner Cohen wrote in
2010 that ‘‘the issue has never been rigidly researched in the Arab side’’ and that in his
discussions with Egyptian military and political leaders who claimed to have had advance
knowledge of Israeli nuclear capability, ‘‘it was never clear . . . whether their claims were
based on actual factual knowledge or on their own theoretical presumptions.’’70
Even unambiguous evidence that Egypt and Syria believed before the 1973 war that
Israel had nuclear weapons would not prove that nuclear deterrence failed Israel as Wilson
argues. One would need to know, in addition, how those nations assessed Israel’s
intentions and its resolve, what they deemed the core national security interests that, if
violated, might push Israel to nuclear retaliation, and how that affected their military
behavior. According to Cohen, ‘‘speculations persist that among the reasons [Egypt and
Syria] had chosen in 1973 limited war aims . . . is their belief that if they crossed certain
Israeli red lines and . . . tried to inflict serious destruction on Israel’s society and economy,
then Israel might resort to using its nuclear weapons.’’71 That perspective suggests that
nuclear deterrence may have been quite successful, but we just cannot say with any
certainty. US, Israeli, Egyptian, Syrian, and Soviet intelligence archives and other official
sources have yet to release information that might begin to justify a high-confidence
judgment like Wilson’s.72
As to the Falklands War, Bluth recently asserted that ‘‘nuclear deterrence was not
relevant because the UK government had no intention to use nuclear weapons and the
Argentines did not believe it would do anything to defend the Falkland Islands.’’73 He and
other scholars who have studied Wilson’s examples intimately might well conclude that
deterrence’s failures are no less speculative than its successes.
Conclusion
‘‘The Myth of Nuclear Deterrence’’ makes an unpersuasive case that nuclear deterrence
has three fatal flaws. Demonstrating that, historically, city destruction has not led to
surrender and that national leaders have evinced unlimited tolerance for civilian deaths
seems to undermine beyond redemption Wilson’s claim that deterrence theorists some-
how came to believe exactly the opposite. If, as Wilson asserts, nuclear deterrence does
rest foundationally upon faith that threats of city destruction elicit forbearance because
leaders are highly sensitive to civilian deaths, he needs to offer another explanation and
better evidence than just the testimony of venerable nuclear weapons scholars. This
alternative explanation would need to assume that the people who made nuclear
deterrence theory came to their faith without either misunderstanding, willfully dis-
regarding, or being ignorant of the history of city attacks, noncombatant casualties, and
war termination dynamics.
Other serious weaknesses in Wilson’s argument include blurring the differences
between related but distinguishable phenomena, stretching Abrahms’s findings about




























research in military history as authority for his assertions about the likelihood and
credibility of extermination attacks.
In the previously mentioned CNS report, ‘‘Delegitimizing Nuclear Weapons,’’
Wilson’s hand is evident in the statement ‘‘the problem in trying to judge the truth
of claims about nuclear deterrence is that proof*the essential ingredient of prudent
judgment*is entirely missing.’’74 He has also said that ‘‘if nuclear deterrence were on
trial for murder, you’d never convict. There’s just not enough evidence.’’75 Wilson
believes that his training in philosophy has greatly enhanced his work as a nuclear
weapons scholar, so perhaps in the future he will address head-on this recurring theme
of ‘‘proof’’ in nuclear weapons policy and decision making.76 What does proof mean, and
how does it relate to evidence? Why must the gold standard of proof (whatever that
may mean) be demanded in nuclear matters, when most governmental, military,
business, and family activities muddle through day-by-day on a much lower standard of
certainty? Most important, what makes the absence of proof that nuclear deterrence
‘‘works’’ so much more compelling than the absence of proof that it does not?77 Let us
hope that Wilson’s forthcoming book will develop more plausible and promising
arguments.
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